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by the majority only as to degree. Gault's importance lies in the
Court's recognition that due process requires more safeguards
in juvenile courts than have previously been provided. It is
likely that notions of fundamental fairness will give rise to the
application of additional constitutional safeguards in the future.
2 9
James M. Small
ERRONEOUS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PAYMENTS:
EFFECTIVE DODGE OF TORT LIABILITY?
After four years of receiving workmen's compensation pay-
ments for an injury sustained while employed by defendant
as a clerk, plaintiff was notified that payments were being
discontinued. Defendant contended payments had been made
only by error, that plaintiff was not engaged in a hazardous
occupation, and that her employer (defendant) was not engaged
in a hazardous business. Plaintiff sued for workman's com-
pensation or, in the alternative, damages for injury ex delicto.
The trial court upheld both defendant's exception of no cause
of action as to workmen's compensation and the exception of
prescription to her action ex delicto. On appeal plaintiff's coun-
sel conceded that the workmen's compensation statute afforded
no coverage to plaintiff. Held, the ex delicto claim was pre-
scribed; prescription was not suspended or interrupted by the
erroneous payment of workmen's compensation. Williamson v.
S. S. Kresge Co., 186 So.2d 696 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), writs
denied, 187 So.2d 741.
Does this case suggest a ready scheme for an employer
29. Several state courts, relying on the instant decision, have required
recordation of the proceedings, a point which was mentioned but not ruled
upon in Gault. Ebersole v. State, 428 P.2d 947 (Idaho 1967); Summers v.
State, 227 N.E.2d 680 (Ind. 1967). It has also been held, as a result of Gault,
that juveniles have the same rights as adults to suppress illegally obtained
evidence (State v. Lowery, 95 N.J. Super. 307, 230 A.2d 907 (1967), and that
change of venue procedure must be accorded juveniles (State v. Lake Juven-
ile Court, 228 N.E.2d 16 (Ind. 1967)). It seems certain, moreover, that the
rationale of Gault will not be limited to proceedings in juvenile courts.
Already a state court has cited Gault as authority for its decision applying
right to counsel to proceedings before a lunacy commission. Commonwealth
v. Shovlin, 210 Pa. Super. 295, 231 A.2d 760 (1967). The court said: "The argu-
ment that McGurrin has not been formally convicted of a crime is no more
persuasive than the argument in Gault that the juvenile is only adjudged
'delinquent.' Euphemistic terminology cannot obscure the fact that McGur-
rin has been thrown in the company of murderers, rapists, and criminals
of every other conceivable nature." Id. at 298, 231 A.2d at 762. See also
Parker v. Heryford, 379 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1967).
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to escape tort liability by forfeiting a relatively small total of
workmen's compensation payments until the ex delicto claim
has prescribed? The principles underlying workmen's compensa-
tion' militate against such unethical use by the employer, but
the result of the Williamson case points out a hiatus between
Louisiana's workmen's compensation legislation and code pro-
visions on ex delicto actions.3
Workmen's compensation coverage in Louisiana is applicable
to hazardous businesses and employments listed in the Work-
men's Compensation Act.4 This limitation, however, does not
necessarily mean that other businesses are excluded. Though
unlisted, a hazardous-in-fact employment can be brought under
compensation coverage by an express agreement between em-
ployer and employee. Additionally, employers and employees in
businesses which are neither listed nor hazardous-in-fact can
extend the coverage of the act to themselves by an express
agreement in writing.5 From these allowable extensions of
compensation coverage, the legislative intent is obvious: a stat-
ute compulsory for some, but available to others who choose
to reap its benefits. Further indication of a legislative tendency
to broaden the compensation principle in Louisiana is found
in a 1958 amendment6 which provides that compensation in-
surers are estopped to deny the hazardous character of the
insured's business. However, all other defenses upon which the
insured might rely, such as the defense that the work was not
a regular part of the employer's business,7 remain available.
The amendment has been interpreted to have no retrospective
operation on an insurer.8
1. Workmen's compensation is predicated on compromise. The employer
sacrifices immunity he would enjoy from accidents not caused by his fault
and gains relief from demands for full tort damages. The employee fore-
goes his right to claim damages commensurate with the injury received
for the security, albeit lesser value, of compensation payments to replace
lost wages. W. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 32 (1951).
2. LA. R.S. 23:1021-1351 (1950).
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2315 (1870) provides, in part: "Every act whatever
of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it hap-
pened to repair it."
Id. art. 3536 provides, in part: "The following actions are also prescribed
by one year: That . . . resulting from offenses or quasi offenses."
4. LA. R.S. 23:1035 (1950).
5. W. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRAcTI cE
§ 92 (1951).
6. LA. R.S. 23:1166 (Supp. 1968), added by La. Acts 1958, No. 495, § 1.
7. Richard v. Landreneau Enterprises, 167 So.2d 827 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1964).
8. W. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 104 (Supp. 1964).
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The 1958 amendment did not apply in Williamson since
defendant was not insured. Additionally, it must be assumed
from the reported decision that there was no written agree-
ment for coverage.
The Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act has a special
provision on prescription of compensation claims.9 If an em-
ployer makes a compensation payment within a year following
the accident, prescription is interrupted and begins to run anew
from the date of the last payment.10 In Williamson, had plaintiff
been entitled to workmen's compensation, prescription would
have started running from the date of her employer's last pay-
ment to her, which was only weeks before filing of the suit.
It is also pertinent to note that had plaintiff been covered
by workmen's compensation, her only legal remedy would have
been under the act, for it excludes other remedies." However,
the worker whose claim falls outside the act has a right of action
against the employer ex delicto,12 despite the fact that he may
have accepted erroneous workmen's compensation payments in
the interim. 3
Therefore, having no right to workmen's compensation, plain-
tiff on appeal confined herself to seeking damages in tort, with
defendant's plea of prescription liberandi causa the sole issue.
The basic theory of liberative prescription has been de-
scribed as "the loss of a right by reason of failure to use it
during a period when it could have been exercised."' 4 The
rationale is that the law affords the action (ex delicto in the
instant case) and can regulate its effective use. Prescription
of tort claims is designed to relieve those who may be charged
with commission of torts from fear of litigation and the uncer-
tainty of unsettled obligations.' 5 Thus the law discourages the
injured from delinquency in taking action.' 6 The law of prescrip-
9. LA. R.S. 23:1209 (1950) provides, in part, that all claims are barred
one year after time of injury unless judicial proceedings have been filed or
the parties have agreed on payments.
10. La. R.S. 23:1209 (1950); W. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 384 (1951).
11. LA. R.S. 23:1032 (1950).
12. Atchison v. May, 201 La. 1003, 10 So.2d 785 (1942).
13. Gerstmayr v. Kolb, 158 So. 647 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935).
14. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term-
Prescription, 8 LA. L. REv. 239, 241 (1948).
15. Davies v. Consolidated Underwriters, 14 So.2d 494 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1943).
16. LA. CrvIL CODE art. 3518 (1870) provides for legal Interruption of pre-
scription by filing of suit.
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tion is not without its balancing aspects, however, and there
are two main exceptions to the rule that prescription begins
to run from the time of the injury: the delayed-knowledge
theory1'7 and contra non volentem agere nulla currit praescriptio
(prescription does not run against one who is unable to act).18
Testing either of these theories in application to the
Williamson fact situation is an interesting maze to follow, but
leads only to the conclusion that neither will provide relief
sought by plaintiff.
The delayed-knowledge theory involves the starting point
for computing prescription. Normally one-year prescription of
a tort action begins at the date of the injury, but when damage
is unknown to the injured party, prescription will not begin
until the date of knowledge. However, this exception to the
general rule contemplates lack of knowledge of the injury
itself; 19 it does not contemplate lack of knowledge of the right.
In the instant case, plaintiff knew she was injured at the occur-
rence of the accident. Regardless of actual knowledge vel non
of her legal rights, Louisiana law charges her with knowledge, 2
as Williamson was quick to point out.21
Contra non volentem contemplates relief for those who lack
legal capacity to act. The maxim expresses a "suspension"
of the running of time of prescription "in favor of ... [persons]
. ..while under legal incapacity to act in the exercise of their
rights. '22 Typical examples are minors and interdicts. Thus
plaintiff might have prevailed in a plea of contra non volentem
if acceptance of workmen's compensation payments were deemed
17. Id. art. 3537 provides that prescription of a tort claim for property
damage will not begin to run until the owner of the property has knowl-
edge or is chargeable with the knowledge of the damage. See thorough
explanation in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1945-1946
Term-Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 7 LA. L. REv. 246, 253 (1947).
18. For history of contra non volentem in Louisiana see Note, 32 TUL.
L. REV. 783 (1958).
19. Logically, it would seem rare for a personal injury to be unknown
to the party at the time of the delict. However, in Perrin v. Rodriguez, 153
So. 555 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1934), the court upheld the delayed-knowledge
theory in favor of a dental patient who suffered from roots of teeth being
left in the gums. Prescription did not start to run against the plaintiff when
there was no knowledge of the fact that there was damage, even though
it did not appear that the knowledge was intentionally concealed from him.
20. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 7 (1870).
21. 186 So.2d 696, 698 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
22. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term-
Prescription, 13 LA. L. REV. 262, 265 (1953).
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a temporary legal bar to plaintiff's assertion of a tort right.
This, however, is not the Louisiana rule.23
In Williamson, plaintiff, conceding the abstract applicability
of the rules of prescription, contended that the defendant com-
pany was estopped from pleading prescription to the tort action
by virtue of its having paid her compensation. She argued that
defendant had "lulled her into a sense of security and, in fact,
induced her to refrain from filing suit ex delicto. ''24 In essence
this is a plea of estoppel in pais.2 5
Estoppel is not limited to a certain type of action such as
contract, but has been recognized generally in tort actions.26
The Williamson court maintained that the length of the work-
men's compensation payments, about four years, precluded "any
suggestion that they were made in order to intentionally
defeat"27 the one-year prescriptive period, implying that no
estoppel could be found without the intent element in defen-
dant's act. It is submitted that not only is it impractical to judge
intent merely by the length of payment,28 but also that intent
is not an essential element to a finding of equitable estoppel.29
23. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. The Williamson court
cited two cases which refused plaintiffs the application of the maxim:
Ayres v. New York Life Ins. Co., 219 La. 945, 54 So.2d 409 (1951), and Green
V. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 144 So.2d 685 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). In
Ayres plaintiff asserted inability to act because of physical incapacity
through illness. In Green claimant alleged deliberate misrepresentation by
an insurance adjuster led to the delay in filing suit.
24. 186 So.2d 696, 698 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
25. BLACK, LAw DIcTnoNARY 689 (3d ed. 1933), quotes Graves & Gross v.
Leach, 192 Ala. 164, 68 So. 297, 298 (1915): "'An "equitable estoppel" or
"estoppel in pals" arises when one represents by words of mouth, conduct,
or silent acquiescence that a certain state of facts exists, thus inducing
another to act in reliance upon the supposed existence of such facts, so
that if the party making the representation were not estopped to deny
its truth, the party relying thereon would be subjected to loss or injury.'"
26. McCampbell v. Southard, 62 Ohio App. 339, 23 N.E.2d 954 (1937), held
that the doctrine of estoppel against pleading the statute of limitations
applied to actions ex delicto as well as ex contractu. Accord, Boston &
Albany R.R. v. Reardon, 226 Mass. 286, 115 N.E. 408 (1917); Renackowsky
V. Water Comm'n, 122 Mich. 613, 81 N.W. 581 (1900).
27. 186 So.2d 696, 698 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
28. Does the court intimate something less than four years might be
"intentional"? Two years? One year and a day? If length of time of pay-
ments is to be the test, Incongruous decisions could be forthcoming. In the
Wlliamson case, defendant paid a total of approximately $5,500 by which
he escaped a claim for $109,500 and a possible total of almost $5,000 more In
weekly installments up to 400 weeks total; this was not intentional. Hypo-
thetically, another employer might try to escape a mere $50,000 claim with
total compensation of $5,500, but in slightly over three years instead of
four, and be deemed "intentional."
29. "The statute of limitations Is for the benefit of individuals, and not
to secure general objects of policy . . . [W]hile the doctrine of estoppel in
pats rests upon the ground of fraud, it is not essential that the representa-
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The court's ruling that the prescription was neither "sus-
pended" nor "interrupted" by the workmen's compensation pay-
ments confuses elements of prescription with the theory of
estoppel. Estoppel in pais is not based on prescription being
suspended or interrupted. Rather estoppel recognizes that pre-
scription has accrued, but that the defendant is barred from
pleading it.80
Noting only three other cases, 81 the Williamson court readily
asserted that Louisiana jurisprudence "militates" against the
plaintiff's right. This writer suggests that although the decision
is in keeping with Louisiana law and jurisprudence on libera-
tive prescription, the result "militates" against equitable prin-
ciples and is completely at odds with the spirit of workmen's
compensation. Admittedly if plaintiff had been covered by work-
men's compensation, she would have had no choice of remedy;
however, her required relinquishment of tort rights would have
been counterbalanced with her right to compensation payments
in keeping with the degree of disability. Conceding that plain-
tiff willingly accepted compensation payments in lieu of tort
damages, she did not willingly agree to a discontinuance of
compensation at the option of defendant. This is not to impute
bad faith to the instant employer, but it seems manifestly
unfair to allow any employer, under cover of law, to engineer
minimization of his own liability, however unconsciously, to the
detriment of his employee's legal rights.
It seems the application of the equitable doctrine of estoppel
would have been justified in the instant case, for "the test
appears to be whether in all the circumstances of the case
conscience and duty of honest dealing should deny one the right
to repudiate the consequences of his representations or con-
duct. '3 2 Perhaps this is the route courts will chart if some
tions or conduct giving rise to its application should be fraudulent in the
strictly legal significance of that term, or with intent to mislead or deceive."
Howard v. West Jersey & Seashore R.R., 102 N.J.Eq. 517, 520, 141 A. 755, 757
(1928); accord, Annot., Estoppel Against Defense of Limitations in Tort
Actions, 77 A.L.R. 1044 (1932).
30. Renackowsky v. Water Comm'n, 122 Mich. 613, 81 N.W. 581 (1900).
See note 29 supra.
31. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. Thompson v. Staples, 341
F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1965), a personal injury case, held that claimant's allega-
tion that an insurance adjuster made deliberate misrepresentations leading
claimant reasonably to believe that insurer had fully intended to settle claim
did not avoid the application of the Louisiana one-year prescription statute.
32. Howard v. West Jersey & Seashore R.R., 102 N.J.Eq. 517, 520, 141 A.
755, 757 (1928).
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unconscionable employer adopts the tactics suggested by the
Williamson fact situation.
An estoppel similar to that of the 1958 amendment" affect-
ing workmen's compensation insurers could be extended by
legislation to cover cases of uninsured employers who make
workmen's compensation payments of this nature. However,
because the amendment covers only the defense of nonhazardous
nature of employment, such estoppel might require extension
to several of the other more important defenses available to
employers. Such legislative measures would seem necessary
only in the face of a widespread use of this dodge of tort liability
by "erroneous" payments.
Janis M. Lasseigne
MINERAL LAW-LEASES-NECESSITY OF PUTTING IN DEFAULT
Plaintiff-lessor sued for cancellation of a mineral lease,
alleging shut-in royalties had not been paid.' Defendant-lessee
answered that by the terms of the lease the lessor was obliged
to give notice of breach before bringing action on the lease2
and that notice had not been given. Defendant also pleaded that
it owed no royalties on the lease. The district judge cancelled
33. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
1. Plaintiff also contended that production royalties had not been timely
paid, but neither the district judge nor the First Circuit relied on nonpay-
ment of production royalties in rendering their decisions. The shut-in roy-
alty clause, clause 3(d) in the lease, reads as follows:
"For any period or periods when, after thirty (30) days following dis-
covery of gas or distillate on the leased premises such product is not being
sold due to lack of a market and is not being used off the leased premises
or in the manufacture of gasoline or other product, and for that reason the
well or wells are shut-in, Lessee shall pay as advance royalty for the shut-in
well or wells an amount per well as set forth in paragrah 4(e) hereof and
pro rata for any lesser period. Said advance royalty shall be payable within
thirty days after the shutting-in of the well or wells. Under such circum-
stances, it will be considered that gas or distillate is being produced, but
such gas well cannot be shut-in for a period longer than two (2) consecutive
years."
Clause 4(e) of the lease states: "For the purpose of calculating shut-in
gas royalty payments, shut-in royalties shall be calculated at $50.00 per
acre per well per year (an arpent is deemed to be an acre)."
2. Clause 9 states: "In the event Lessor considers that Lessee has failed
to comply with one or more of its obligations hereunder, either expressed
or implied, Lessor shall notify Lessee in writing setting out specifically in
what respects Lessor claims Lessee has breached this lease. The service of
such notice and the lapse of thirty (30) days without Lessee's meeting or
commencing to meet the alleged breaches shall be a condition precedent to
such action by Lessor on this lease."
